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Abstract 
 
To our knowledge, this is the first paper to examine the informational efficiency of the equity 
market as compared to the syndicated bank loan market. The loan market is a private market 
comprised of financial institutions with access to private information. We test whether this is 
reflected in informationally efficient price formation in the loan market vis a vis the equity 
markets, and reject this private information hypothesis. We find support for a liquidity 
hypothesis, suggesting that equity markets lead loan markets, despite bank lenders’ access to 
private information, because of greater liquidity in equity markets. Only when equity markets are 
relatively illiquid do we find evidence supporting the private information hypothesis. Finally, we 
find evidence of abnormal returns if portfolios are constructed using lagged equity returns to 
designate investments in the syndicated bank loan market. 
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1. Introduction 
A firm generally issues several types of securities, each of which represents some claim 
on the firm’s assets. If capital markets are perfect and frictionless, then all information about the 
value of the firm’s assets is reflected immediately into the prices of each of the firm’s securities. 
However, capital markets are neither perfect nor frictionless. Different markets have access to 
different types of firm-specific information. Traders may prefer one market venue to another. 
The price formation system may differ in efficiency across markets. These market imperfections 
may prevent the integration of securities markets in incorporating all available information about 
the value of the firm’s assets. In this paper, we compare the relationship between equity returns 
and the contemporaneous and lagged returns on secondary market prices of bank debt in order to 
test the integration between the equity and bank loan markets.  Moreover, we reverse our tests 
and examine the relation between loan returns and contemporaneous and lagged equity returns. 
We employ Granger causality tests to compare each market’s impact on the other. 
During the mid-1990s, a relatively liquid secondary market developed for a segment of 
the bank debt market: syndicated bank loans. Thomas and Wang (2004) find that by the year 
1994, the leveraged loan market had developed to such a point that junk bond yields and spreads 
on bank loans were determined by the same underlying firm-specific and market liquidity 
factors.1 The development of this liquid securities market may have spillover information effects 
for other markets, such as publicly traded debt and equity. This is particularly relevant since 
 
1 Leveraged loans are non-investment grade loans made to highly leveraged borrowers. They are priced at spreads 
that exceed 200 basis points over LIBOR. 
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syndicated bank loans are underwritten by groups of informed lenders that may have access to 
the regular receipt of private information obtained in response to loan covenants that require the 
borrowing firm to release detailed financial and accounting data to the loan syndicate. Moreover, 
the syndicate is typically led by a lead arranger or a lead bank that has gathered a considerable 
amount of private information about the borrowing firm in the course of a long term banking 
relationship. Thus, Altman, Gande and Saunders (2003) find that the syndicated bank loan 
market is more informationally efficient than the bond market, such that default events are more 
rapidly incorporated into loan prices than bond prices. The finding of greater informational 
efficiency in the syndicated bank loan market is denoted the private information hypothesis. 
However, debt markets in general, and syndicated bank loan markets in particular, are 
considerably less liquid than public equity markets.2 Thus, although lenders may have access to 
superior information, noise in the price formation process in the syndicated bank loan market 
may hamper informational efficiency. We denote this the liquidity hypothesis. Thus, Kwan 
(1996) finds that the stock market is more informationally efficient than the bond market. 
Moreover, Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002) find that neither the bond nor the stock market lead each 
other in incorporating firm-specific information, but appear to be contemporaneously reacting to 
common factors. 
In this paper, we compare the level of information integration in the equity market to that 
of the syndicated bank loan market. To our knowledge, this is the first paper to compare the 
informational efficiency of public equity to private debt markets. Public debt holders tend to 
have access to the same set of information about the firm as do public equity holders, thereby 
 
2 Most debt instruments trade over the counter in a negotiated interdealer market.  Saunders, Srinivasan and Walter 
(2002) show that the corporate bond market is characterized by large spreads and infrequent trades.  See Saunders 
and Allen (2002), chapter 5, for a discussion of illiquidity factors in bond markets. 
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suggesting that bond returns and stock returns reflect the same firm-specific information. 
However, information flows differently in private as opposed to public debt markets.3 Thus, we 
examine whether the private information hypothesis or the liquidity hypothesis dominates in 
equity and syndicated bank loan markets. 
Our findings suggest that the liquidity hypothesis dominates the private information 
hypothesis over our sample period, ranging from 1999 to 2003. We compare the price formation 
process in both markets and find that loan returns are related to lagged and contemporaneous 
equity returns, whereas equity returns are generally unrelated to either lagged or 
contemporaneous loan returns. We utilize Granger causality tests to verify that loan returns 
incorporate lagged stock returns, but stock returns do not generally reflect loan returns. We also 
document the presence of significant abnormal returns when lagged equity returns are used to 
design an investment strategy in the syndicated bank loan market. There is one important 
exception to this finding. For relatively illiquid equity issues (i.e., that have a low volume of 
transactions), we find that lagged loan returns Granger cause equity returns, as well as lagged 
equity returns Granger cause loan returns. Thus, when the liquidity hypothesis does not hold, we 
find evidence in support of the private information hypothesis.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we construct portfolios using our sample 
of 45,586 weekly loan and equity returns in order to examine the integration of loan and equity 
returns. We test the cross-correlations across markets using Granger causality tests and search for 
the presence of abnormal returns resulting from predictability across markets. In Section 3, we 
segment the sample in order to test the private information hypothesis with subsamples of 
informationally intensive loans. We also create liquidity-constrained subsamples in order to test 
 
3 For a survey of the literature on bank loans as privately placed debt, see Boot (2000). 
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the liquidity hypothesis more directly. In Section 4, we define borrower- and loan-specific factors 
and test the impact of these factors on the degree and direction of market integration. The paper 
concludes in Section 5. 
 
2. Testing the Integration Between the Loan and the Equity Markets 
There is a fairly extensive literature comparing the informational efficiency of the bond 
market to the stock market. For example, Keim and Stambaugh (1986), Campbell (1987) and 
Campbell and Ammer (1993) examine the problem in the aggregate. Kwan (1996) examines the 
relative informational efficiency of the stock and bond market for individual firms. Hotchkiss 
and Ronen (2002) examine the question using intraday data. However, there has been virtually 
no work examining the integration of the equity and bank loan markets.4 
 There are two major distinguishing features differentiating equity from bank loan 
markets. First, bank loans are debt instruments, and may therefore be less sensitive than equity to 
firm-specific information because of debt’s contractual limitation on the potential for upside 
gain. Second, bank loans are private debt instruments, and therefore have different information 
and liquidity features than publicly traded debt or equity. A literature has developed comparing 
the informational efficiency of public debt to public equity markets, but there has been virtually 
no work on the efficiency of integration of public and private financial markets. 
 Cornell and Green (1991) and Blume, Keim and Patel (1991) were among the first to 
examine the pricing performance of below-investment grade corporate bonds relative to high 
 
4 Dahiya, Puri and Saunders (2003) examine the reaction of stock prices to bank loan sales and find that stock 
returns are negatively impacted by the announcement of a loan sale.  Allen, Guo and Weintrop (2004) find that 
earnings announcements are reflected more rapidly in bank loan prices than in stock prices. These results suggest 
that information about firm-specific events (e.g., loan sales or earnings announcements) is incorporated in the bank 
loan market and transmitted to the stock market.  However, they are not tests of cointegration across markets. 
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grade corporate bonds and stocks.5 Cornell and Green (1990) use mutual fund data and find that 
the market for low-grade corporate bonds is as efficient as the market for high-grade bonds. 
Similarly, Blume, Keim and Patel (1991) use individual bond data and find that the price 
formation process in below investment grade bond markets is as efficient as high grade bond and 
stock markets. However, these studies do not explicitly test for informational efficiency. Kwan 
(1996) rectifies this and employs cointegration tests of whether contemporaneous and lagged 
stock returns explain bond returns. He finds evidence of significant coefficients on lagged stock 
returns for both investment grade and below investment grade bonds, suggesting that the stock 
market leads the bond market.6 However, Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002) refute this result, using 
intraday data on individual high yield bonds that trade on NASD’s Fixed Income Pricing System 
(FIPS). This relatively liquid corporate bond market displays greater informational efficiency 
than found in Kwan’s sample. Although Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002) do not test it directly, their 
results offer support for the liquidity hypothesis, since they find informational efficiency for the 
liquid corporate bonds in their sample. However, neither Kwan (1996) nor Hotchkiss and Ronen 
(2002) reverse their model specification in order to explicitly test whether lagged bond returns 
can explain stock returns. We perform that analysis in this paper using returns on syndicated 
bank loans. 
The syndicated bank loan market is actually a hybrid between publicly traded debt 
(corporate bonds) and privately held (non-traded) bank loans. Trading in the syndicated bank 
loan market is limited to financial institutions and sophisticated investors as a result of the 
 
5 Many syndicated bank loans are below investment grade either from initiation (i.e., leveraged loans that have debt 
to cash flow ratios exceeding 4:1) or as a result of deterioration over time in the loan’s credit quality (“fallen 
angels”). 
6 The exception to the finding that lagged stock returns explain bond returns in Kwan (1996) is for AAA-rated 
corporate bonds, which depend more on the risk free rate than on firm-specific information.  However, Hotchkiss 
and Ronen (2002) find that the distinction between high grade and low-grade bonds is only weakly significant. 
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designation of these instruments as Rule 144a securities. This limits market liquidity, but also 
restricts the amount of noise trading in the bank loan market. Participants include banks, as well 
as non-bank financial intermediaries.7 To the extent that many bank loans contain covenants 
requiring the borrower to transfer detailed financial information to loan syndicate members on a 
regular basis, the information features of the bank loan market make it more informationally 
efficient than the bond market.8 The question that our paper addresses is whether the loan market 
is more informationally efficient than the stock market. 
2.1.  Data 
We obtain a sample of secondary market data from the Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC) 
that consists of the average bid and average ask quotations on all syndicated bank loans that had 
at least 2 quotes for any week during the January 1999 through May 2003 period. A total of 
129,172 observations met these criteria, associated with 1,621 loan facilities to 763 borrowers.  
For each observation for which the previous week’s loan price is available for the loan 
facility, we calculate the weekly loan return, RBt, using the average of the mean bid and mean 
ask quotation as a proxy for loan transaction price.9  We next extract from CRSP weekly equity 
returns that correspond to the weekly loan returns. Through the comparison of tickers and names, 
we identify 357 of the 763 borrowers on CRSP.  Weekly equity price information is available for 
352 of these 357 borrowers during our sample period. We use this weekly information to 
calculate weekly equity returns, denoted RSt, after standardizing the price by the cumulative 
factor to adjust for splits and dividends.  After eliminating any observation for which the return 
 
7 A trade study by Paine Webber shows that, as of 1998, more than 40% of the syndicated bank loan facilities were 
comprised of non-bank financial institutions, with 26% of the loans held by bank loan mutual funds and 5% held by 
insurance companies. 
8 Bradley and Roberts (2004) find that a loan is more likely to include covenants if the borrower is small, highly 
leveraged, and relies on intangible growth opportunities for firm value. 
9 There is no “tape” of transaction prices in the negotiated secondary market for bank loans.  We use the average of 
the bid and ask quotations as an estimate of the transaction price. 
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information is unavailable, we are left with 50,244 observations, associated with 772 loan 
facilities to 352 borrowers. 
We also extract the S&P 500 Composite Index from CRSP and calculate the weekly 
equity index return, RMt, for each observation. Using the S&P/LSTA syndicated bank loan 
index, we calculate the weekly loan index return, RLt, for each observation.10  Finally, we obtain 
the annualized 3-month secondary market T-Bill rates from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis as of the date of each observation to the observation date and calculate the weekly 3-month 
T-Bill rate, RDt.  
For each week during our sample period, we form equally weighted portfolios of equity 
and loan returns consisting of all observations for which all variables, including lags, are 
available for the week. To perform the integration tests, we test several price formation models, 
incorporating lagged equity (loan) returns ranging from one (zero) week lags to four (three) week 
lags. The number of weekly portfolio observations ranged from 185 (for the model with four 
weeks of equity lags) to 200 (for the model incorporating only one week of lagged equity 
returns). We report the results of the model using two weeks of lagged equity returns and one 
week of lagged loan returns, resulting in a sample size of 194 weekly portfolio observations 
comprising 45,586 individual loan and equity returns.11 
As the descriptive statistics in Table I show, the average loan return is negative over the 
sample period (a mean of –0.08%, statistically different from zero at the 1% level of significance 
of the t-test). This is most likely the outgrowth of the sample period, a considerable portion of 
 
10 LSTA, in conjunction with Standard & Poor’s, maintains a weekly index of senior bank loan prices. The 
S&P/LSTA syndicated bank loan index currently includes 470 loan facilities totaling $104 billion in value 
outstanding, covering around 70% of the institutional loan market. Starting in January 1999, the S&P leverage loan 
index provides weekly quotes on the syndicated loan market index. 
11 Our results are extremely robust to all lag structures, and are available from the authors upon request. 
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which coincided with a recession, the deepening of liquidity discounts, declining loan prices and 
a large group of “fallen angels,” i.e., distressed loans that formerly traded at or around par. 
In addition to the measures of return described above, we also identify the year of each 
observation, denoted Yt; the sum of the number of bid and ask quotations for the loan i on the 
secondary loan market for the date t of the observation, denoted NBAit; the difference between 
the average ask and average bid loan i price on the date t of the observation, denoted SPRDit; and 
the volume of trades in the equity market for borrower i on the date t of the observation, denoted 
Vt. Table I reports that the average number of loan quotes in our sample is greater than 8, the 
average bid/ask loan spread is 164 basis points, and the average volume of equity transactions is 
approximately 931,400 for our sample observations. 
2.2. Cointegration Tests 
In this section we examine the relation between loan and equity returns. We use the 
Generalized Method of Moments to estimate the following return-generating processes:  
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This specification is similar to the cointegration tests specified in Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002).12  
Table II reports the results of estimation of the processes specified in equations (1) and 
(2). The results indicate that the equity market leads the loan market in incorporating firm-
specific information. The estimation of equation (1) results in a statistically significant (at the 5% 
 
12 One notable distinction between our model and Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002) is that we include both the loan index 
return and US Treasury bill rate in the same model, whereas Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002) alternate between these 
two variables. Our tests are robust to the exclusion of either loan index return or the T-Bill rate.  
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level) coefficient on lagged equity returns (RSt-1) in explaining loan returns. However, the 
estimation of equation (2) shows that lagged and contemporaneous loan returns do not have a 
statistically significant impact on equity returns. Thus, equity returns have explanatory power in 
determining loan returns, but loan returns have no explanatory power with regard to equity 
returns. These results support the liquidity hypothesis and refute the private information 
hypothesis.13 Other results of the estimation are unsurprising. For each regression, the respective 
index has statistically significant explanatory power on the contemporaneous index, whether the 
loan index, RLt for equation (1) or the S&P 500 index, RMt for equation (2).  
2.3. Causality 
In this section, we test whether we can identify evidence of Granger causality (Granger 
(1969), Sims (1972)) in the relationship between loan and equity returns. We use the Bivariate 
Granger Causality Test to separately test whether we can reject the null hypothesis that equity 
returns do not Granger cause loan returns, and whether we can reject the null hypothesis that 
loan returns do not Granger cause equity returns. We implement the tests through OLS 
estimating the following models: 
,1211 ttttt RSRBRB εββα +++= −−    (3) 
.1211 ttttt RBRSRS εββα +++= −−   (4)  
 
where β1 and β2 are coefficients. Each model is estimated twice.  First, the restricted estimation 
excludes the variables RSt-1 and RBt-1 from equations (3) and (4), respectively. Second, the 
unrestricted estimation of equations (3) and (4) is performed without excluding any variables.  
 
13 These results are robust to all model specifications and lag structures. We find strong evidence of a relationship 
between lagged equity returns and loan returns, but not of a relationship between lagged loan returns and equity 
returns. 
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Comparing the sum of squared residuals for the unrestricted and restricted models, we conduct 
F-tests and asymptotically equivalent tests of the null hypothesis that β2 = 0 in equations (3) and 
(4). The results of the tests of whether we can reject the null hypothesis that equity returns do not 
Granger cause loan returns are reported in the first Column of Table III, whereas the results of 
the Granger causality test of the null hypothesis that loan returns do not cause equity returns are 
reported in the second Column of Table III.  
The results of the Granger tests of equation (3) reject the null hypothesis using both the 
F-test and the asymptotically equivalent test.14 The value of the F-test statistic is 29.5525, 
whereas the value of the asymptotically equivalent test statistic is 30.0167, both significant at the 
1% level. Thus, the results of Column (1) of Table III suggest that equity returns Granger cause 
loan returns. 
The results of the Granger causality tests of equation (4) fail to reject the null hypothesis 
using both the F-test and the asymptotically equivalent test. The value of the F-test statistic is 
1.1727, whereas the value of the asymptotically equivalent test statistic is 1.1911, both 
statistically insignificant. Thus, the results of Column (2) of Table III do not support the 
contention that equity returns are Granger caused by loan returns.  Both sets of Granger causality 
test results, therefore, support the liquidity hypothesis and refute the private information 
hypothesis. 
2.4. Abnormal Portfolio Returns 
In Section 2.2, we demonstrate that the equity returns lead loan returns, but not vice 
versa. In Section 2.3, we demonstrate that equity returns Granger cause loan returns, but loan 
returns do not Granger cause equity returns. These results imply rejection of the private 
 
14 These results are robust to model specification and lag structure. 
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information hypothesis in favor of the liquidity hypothesis.  Moreover, they suggest predictability 
in loan returns that may be used to generate abnormal portfolio returns. Therefore, as another test 
of the results in Sections 2.2 and 2.3, we construct portfolios based on lagged returns and test for 
possible arbitrage opportunities resulting from predictability in pricing across the bank loan and 
equity markets.  
For every week in the time period, we separately form equally weighted portfolios 
consisting of loan (equity) return observations for which the lagged equity (loan) return in excess 
of the T-bill return is positive or negative. We then subtract the loan (equity) return on the 
negative lagged equity (loan) portfolio from the return on the positive lagged equity (loan) to 
simulate a portfolio consisting of long positions in loans (stocks) with positive lagged equity 
(loan) returns and short positions in loans (stocks) with negative lagged equity (loan) returns. 
Thus, we test whether one could earn abnormal returns in the loan market by buying loans with 
positive lagged equity returns and selling loans with negative lagged equity returns. In addition, 
we test whether one could earn abnormal returns in the equity market by trading on loan return 
information; that is, buying stocks with positive lagged loan returns and selling stocks with 
negative lagged loan returns. 
To test whether this investment strategy can generate abnormal returns, we first report the 
mean weekly return on the long/short portfolio returns in excess of US Treasury bill rates over 
the sample period. Table IV presents these results. The top panel of Table IV examines whether 
abnormal returns can be earned by using lagged equity returns to construct loan portfolios. We 
find evidence of significant (at the 5% level) abnormal returns, averaging 6 basis points per 
week, supporting our earlier findings that the equity market leads the loan market. Thus, 
information about equity returns can be profitably used to trade in the loan market. 
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We also use a single factor model to regress excess returns on the constructed long/short 
loan portfolio against excess loan index returns. The intercept of this regression should denote 
abnormal returns on the portfolio. The top panel of Table IV presents an intercept (alpha) term of 
almost 5 basis points (significant at the 10.12% level). This suggests the presence of abnormal 
returns when constructing portfolios of loans using lagged equity returns.  
We find no evidence of abnormal returns in the equity market. That is, we test an 
investment strategy using lagged loan returns to design equity portfolios, such that the portfolio 
is rebalanced each week to buy stocks with positive lagged loan returns and sell stocks with 
negative lagged loan returns. The bottom panel of Table IV reports that the average return on 
these portfolios is insignificantly different from zero. Moreover, using a single index model of 
excess equity returns on excess equity market returns, we find that the intercept term (alpha) is 
insignificantly different from zero. Thus, we find no evidence that loan returns have power in 
explaining equity returns. Using these three different approaches (integration tests, Granger 
causality tests and measures of potential abnormal returns), we conclude that the equity market is 
more informationally efficient than the loan market. 
 
3. Direct Tests of the Liquidity and Private Information Hypotheses 
The results of the tests reported in Section 2 provide support for the liquidity hypothesis 
over the private information hypothesis in that we find that the more liquid equity markets tend 
to lead the more informationally-intensive loan markets. However, we have not tested these 
hypotheses directly. In this section, we divide our sample of 45,586 individual weekly loan and 
equity returns into various subsamples in order to construct weekly portfolios that differ 
systematically on the basis of liquidity and information content. For each criterion, we split the 
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sample in half using the sample median to construct subsamples.15 Thus, for example, the entire 
sample has a median of 8 loan quotes. Therefore, in Tables V-VII, the low (high) number of loan 
quotes subsample comprises the observations with less than (more than) 8 bid plus ask 
quotations. Each of the subsamples in Tables V-VII is similarly defined. 
3.1. Testing the Private Information Hypothesis 
Private firm-specific information is obtained by the members of the syndicate in the 
course of the lending relationship. It is the function of the lead bank to monitor the activities of 
the borrower in order to continually update the syndicate on the quality of the loan. Moreover, 
many bank loans require the regular transfer of detailed financial information in order to check 
on the borrower’s compliance with specific loan covenants. This feature allows greater flexibility 
in syndicated bank loans than in publicly traded debt. For example, borrowers in financial 
distress often renegotiate their bank debt, thereby avoiding the deadweight costs of default and 
bankruptcy that are more prevalent for publicly held bonds. Renegotiation is often triggered by 
the breaching of covenants that dictate rules defining the borrower’s technical default of the loan 
agreement. 
There are two major types of covenants: financial covenants and general covenants. 
Financial covenants institute rules that circumscribe the borrower’s financial performance. 
General covenants institute behavioral rules that bind the borrower. Since financial covenants 
relate to accounting variables and firm financial ratios, monitoring compliance requires regular 
(usually monthly) reports of private firm-specific information. In our database, the most 
prevalent financial covenant is a restriction on the maximum debt to EBITDA ratio (i.e., total 
 
15 Table I presents median values for the constructed portfolios.  In this section, we determine the median associated 
with the individual observations database comprised of the pooled time series cross sectional data.  We then 
construct portfolios for each subsample separately.  There are slight differences between portfolio medians (reported 
in Table I) and pooled sample medians. 
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debt divided by cash flow as measured by net income plus depreciation and other non-cash 
charges). Thus, all borrowers with a debt to EBITDA covenant in their bank loans would be 
required to submit a statement of EBITDA and debt outstanding on a monthly basis to the loan 
syndicate.16 Other common covenants are a net worth requirement, tangible net worth 
requirement, and current ratio covenant. All require regular reporting of sensitive financial data 
to the members of the syndicate. To reflect this private information, we segment our sample into 
those loans that have financial covenants and those that do not. 
We construct two sets of portfolios, consisting of loans with and without financial 
covenants, and calculate weekly portfolio returns for both equity and loan markets. These returns 
are then used to re-estimate equations (1) and (2) to test for integration between the loan and 
equity markets. Table V presents the results of the GMM estimation of equation (1) for each 
subsample, to test whether lagged equity returns can explain loan returns. Column (7) of Table V 
reports the results for the more informationally intensive subsample of loans with financial 
covenants, as compared to Column (8) that shows the loans without financial covenants. Lagged 
equity returns have significant (at the 5% level or better) coefficients in explaining loan returns 
for the subsample of loans with financial covenants, whereas the equity return coefficients are 
insignificant for the subsample of loans without financial covenants. Thus, equity returns lead 
loan returns for the informationally intensive subsample, a result that is inconsistent with the 
private information hypothesis that would suggest that loan returns lead equity returns for this 
subsample.   Moreover, Table VI presents the results of the GMM estimation of equation (2) 
testing whether lagged loan returns can explain equity returns for each subsample of the database 
– column (7) for the informationally intensive sample of loans with financial covenants and 
 
16 Allen, Guo and Weintrop (2004) find evidence of this monthly timing in the information content of earnings 
announcements. 
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column (8) for those loans without financial covenants. There is no evidence in the estimated 
coefficients in columns (7) and (8) in Table VI in support of the private information hypothesis.  
Both contemporaneous and lagged loan returns have insignificant coefficients for both 
subsamples of loans with and without financial covenants, suggesting that the private 
information transmitted in compliance with loan covenants does not cause loan returns to lead 
(or explain) equity returns. 
Industry convention is to designate distressed loans as loans trading at prices of 70 or 
below. These are the loans that are in imminent danger of default and would consequently 
generate the most intensive monitoring by bank lenders. Thus, banks should have more private 
information for the distressed loan subsample than for the subsample of par loans (trading at 90 
or above). Thus, the private information hypothesis would anticipate that the lagged loan returns 
would have more explanatory power in determining equity returns for the distressed subsample 
as compared to the par loan subsample.  Columns (5) and (6) in Tables V and VI show that this 
is not the case, thereby refuting the private information hypothesis. Lagged equity returns have 
significant (at the 1% level) coefficients in Column (5) of Table V for distressed loan portfolio 
returns, but not for par loan portfolios in Column (6), suggesting that equity markets lead loan 
markets in the information-intensive distressed loan subsample. Moreover, Columns (5) and (6) 
of Table VI show that lagged loan returns have no explanatory power for equity returns.  Thus, 
the results in Tables V and VI offer no support for the private information hypothesis. 
3.2 Testing the Liquidity Hypothesis   
We designate subsamples of the database to directly test the liquidity hypothesis such that 
the subsamples are segmented on the basis of trading activity in the loan and equity markets. The 
17 
 
 
two measures of loan market liquidity are the number of loan quotes and the loan bid/ask spread. 
The measure of equity market liquidity is the volume of equity transactions. 
Table VI shows some support for the liquidity hypothesis. The most liquid loans tend to 
have more quotes and lower spreads. The information content of the loan market in explaining 
equity returns is analyzed in Table VI for the subsample with an above-median number of quotes 
in Column (2) and for the subsample with a below-median spread in Column (3); i.e., the most 
liquid loan portfolios. The significant (at the 10% level or better) coefficients for lagged and 
contemporaneous loan returns in explaining equity returns for the high number of quotes, 
Column (2), and low loan spreads, Column (3), subsamples suggests that loan returns have some 
explanatory power in determining equity returns when loan markets are relatively liquid.  
Moreover, equity returns have little explanatory power in determining loan returns when loan 
markets are relatively illiquid, as shown in Columns (1) and (4) in Table V.  That is, when loan 
markets are illiquid (few quotes in Column (1) and high loan spreads in Column (4)), then lagged 
and contemporaneous equity returns have little or no explanatory power in determining loan 
returns.  This provides support for the liquidity hypothesis in that information cannot be 
efficiently incorporated into prices in illiquid markets. 
Controlling for equity market liquidity suggests further support for the liquidity 
hypothesis. The significant (at the 10% level) coefficient on the lagged loan returns in Column 
(9) of Table VI is consistent with a leading information role for loan returns when equity markets 
are relatively illiquid.  In contrast, when equity volume is high (Column (10) of Table VI), loan 
returns have no explanatory power in determining equity returns. 
The Granger causality tests for the subsamples presented in Table VII provide further 
support for the liquidity hypothesis over the private information hypothesis. As we found in the 
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Granger tests of whether lagged equity returns Granger cause loan returns presented in Table III, 
the Granger causality tests are all significant in Panel A, further supporting our conclusion that 
lagged equity returns Granger cause loan market returns. Significance is at the 1% level, with the 
exception of the subsample of loans without financial covenants, where the tests are significant 
at the 10% level.  
We generally reject the hypothesis that lagged loan returns Granger cause equity returns, 
as indicated by the insignificance of almost all tests reported in Panel B of Table VII. However, 
when equity markets are relatively illiquid (i.e., when equity trading volume is low, as in 
Column (9) of Panel B of Table VII), then the Granger causality tests are significant at the 5% 
level. These results suggest that lagged loan returns Granger cause equity returns when equity 
markets are illiquid. Further, when there are few loan market quotes the Granger causality tests 
are significant at the 10% level. Therefore, when the liquidity hypothesis does not hold because 
of market illiquidity, the private information inherent in loan prices becomes significant and the 
private information hypothesis is supported.  
 
4. Controlling for Borrower and Loan Characteristics 
In Sections 2 and 3, we use several methodologies to demonstrate that liquid equity 
markets lead bank loan markets, thereby supporting the liquidity hypothesis over the private 
information hypothesis.  However, these results may be driven by specific loan or borrower 
characteristics. For example, the covenant structure of the bank loan dictates the private 
information flows that are made available to the lending syndicate, thereby impacting the 
informativeness of loan prices. Moreover, the structure of the syndicate itself (e.g., the number of 
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lenders) will determine the efficiency with which information gained through bank monitoring is 
shared. In this section, we control for loan-specific and borrower-specific variables. 
4.1. Loan Facility-Specific and Borrower-Specific Data 
In this section, we describe additional loan facility-specific data and borrower-specific 
data as well as the methodology used to form equally-weighted portfolios of weekly loan and 
equity returns. Two types of variables are identified: those variables that vary across both time 
and across loan facilities, and loan facility variables that are recorded at the time of loan 
initiation, and do not vary across time for a specific loan facility.  
The time-series variables include LNMV (the natural log of the market value of the 
borrowing firm’s equity obtained from CRSP as of the date of the secondary loan market 
observation); LNDEBT (the natural logarithm of the borrower’s debt obtained from 
COMPUSTAT for the year of the observation); LEVERAGE (the borrower’s ratio of total debt 
to total assets obtained from COMPUSTAT for the year of the observation); INCOMTOA (the 
borrower’s ratio of operating income before depreciation to total assets obtained from 
COMPUSTAT for the year of the observation); EPS (the borrower’s earning per share obtained 
from COMPUSTAT for the year of the observation); and PENNYSTOCK (an indicator variable 
that takes on the value of 1 if the borrower’s stock is priced below $1 on the date of the 
secondary loan market observation).17  
In addition, the time series variable PROB_KMV is the implied default probability on the 
date of the secondary market observation, estimated using the options-theoretic approach that is 
detailed in Allen and Peristiani (2004).18 Newton’s nonlinear approximation technique is 
 
17 The stock price is standardized by the cumulative factor used by CRSP to adjust for splits and dividends. 
18 Also see Chapter 4 of Saunders and Allen (2002) for a general discussion of options-theoretic approaches.  
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implemented to solve the following system of two nonlinear equations for borrower i’s asset 
value and asset volatility at time t, VAit  and σAit: 
)()( TDDNLeDDNVV Aititit
Tr
itAitEit
t σ−−= −     (5) 
Aitit
Eit
Ait
Eit DDNV
V σσ )(=        (6) 
where [ ] TrTLVDD AitAittitAitit σσ /)5.0()/ln( 2++= . VEit is the market value of borrower i’s 
equity at time t (defined earlier); Lit is the borrower’s debt, defined as the value of the borrower’s 
long-term debt as reported on COMPUSTAT for the fiscal year that ends in the same year as the 
secondary market observation; rt is the risk free rate, defined as the annualized one year constant 
maturity US Treasury bill rate from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis on the date of the 
secondary market observation; σEit is borrower i’s equity volatility at time t, defined as the 
standard deviation of the borrower’s daily returns, extracted from CRSP, for a minimum of 30 
and a maximum of 100 trading days before the date of the secondary market observation; T is the 
one year estimation period, and N( ) is the normal distribution. Following the solution, we 
calculate the implied default probability as N(-DDit).  
Detailed data about the borrower and each loan facility as of the date of loan origination 
is available on Loan Pricing Corporation’s Dealscan database. We use these data to obtain cross-
sectional control variables, which include measures of rating, loan size, spreads and fees, 
maturity, collateral, loan type, refinancing, covenants, lender participation, and purpose, all 
recorded at loan initiation. Debt rating is the Moody’s senior debt rating. The borrower is non-
rated for approximately 19% of the revolving and term loans initially extracted from the LPC 
database. In order to avoid eliminating a large proportion of observations due to the non-rated 
cases debt ratings, we create three indicator variables, designated ARATE, BRATE, and 
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CRATE. ARATE is equal to unity if the debt rating is between A3 and Aaa and zero otherwise. 
Similarly, BRATE is equal to unity if the debt rating is between B3 and Baa1 and zero 
otherwise, while CRATE is equal to unity if the debt rating is between C and Caa and zero 
otherwise. Thus, the non-rated group, NOTRATED, is the base case. 
Measures of loan size include LNDEALSIZE and LNFACILITYSIZE, which are the 
natural logarithm of the deal and facility size, respectively. Measures of spreads and fees include 
LSPREAD, UPFRONT_FEE, ANNUAL_FEE, and COMMITMENT_FEE. LSPREAD is the 
basis point coupon spread over LIBOR plus the annual fee and upfront fee, spread over the life 
of the loan, known as the “all in spread” in the LPC database. The UPFRONT_FEE variable is 
the upfront fee, the ANNUAL_FEE variable is the annual fee, and the COMMITMENT_FEE 
variable is the commitment fee charged on unused portions of the loan. 
The bank loan’s maturity, denoted MATURITY, is the number of days until the loan 
facility matures, as specified at initiation. The indicator variable SECURED_YES is equal to 
unity if the facility is designated as secured by collateral. Measures of loan type are 
LOAN_REVOLVER and LOAN_TERM, which are indicator variables that are equal to unity if 
the loan is a revolver or term loan, respectively. Thus, LOAN_OTHER is the base case. The 
measure of refinancing is REFINANCING_YES, which is an indicator variable that is equal to 
unity if LPC database designates the loan facility as stemming from a refinancing. 
The existence of loan covenants is an important determinant of the information flows that 
are received by the lenders. For example, the borrower must supply the syndicate with detailed 
reports on a monthly basis to designate whether the loan covenants have been violated. If the 
loan covenants are financial in nature, then the borrower must reveal confidential information 
about the firm’s financial condition. For example, the most commonly used loan covenant in our 
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database specifies a maximum debt to EBITDA ratio. To demonstrate compliance with this 
covenant, the borrower must release monthly estimates of debt and earnings (EBITDA) to the 
loan syndicate. We define an indicator variable, FINANCIAL_COVENANT, to equal one if 
there the loan facility contains any of several financial covenants associated with the loan 
facility, including limitations on debt to EBITDA, debt to equity, net worth, tangible net worth, 
interest current ratios, and debt to tangible net worth ratios. The variable 
NONFINANCIAL_COVENANT is an indicator variable that is equal to unity if there are any of 
several nonfinancial covenants associated with the loan facility, including covenants related to 
dividend restrictions, term changes, asset sales sweep, insurance proceeds, equity issue sweep, 
and debt issue sweep.19  We define PPC to be an indicator variable that is equal to unity if the 
loan facility has a performance pricing covenant.20  
The measure of lender participation is NUMBSYN, which is the number of lenders in the 
syndicate providing the loan. Esty and Megginson (2002) demonstrate that the structure of the 
syndicate (in particular, the number of syndicate members) can be used to offset deficiencies in 
the legal enforcement and shareholder rights environment. For example, in countries with weak 
shareholder rights and uncertain legal enforcement of claims, Esty and Megginson (2002) find 
that loan syndicates tend to be larger and more diffuse, thereby credibly precommiting the 
borrower to fulfillment of the loan’s terms and precluding loan renegotiation.  
We define variables related to the purpose of the syndicated bank loan. Allen and 
Peristiani (2004) show that general purpose bank loans are most subject to moral hazard and risk 
 
19 Sweeps require automatic prepayment of the bank loan with the proceeds of either asset sales (in an asset sales 
sweep covenant), equity or debt issues (in equity issue and debt issue sweeps, respectively).  The form of this 
covenant is in percentage terms, designating the fraction of the proceeds that must be used to prepay the bank loan 
under the sweep trigger. 
20 The performance pricing covenant provides for automatic changes in the loan’s spread triggered by changes in the 
firm’s financial condition, as measured by loan ratings, financial ratios, etc. 
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shifting and thus are priced differently than loans with proscribed goals. We define the following 
indicator variables: PURPOSE_CHANGE_OF_CONTROL (equal to unity if the purpose of the 
loan is as an acquisition line, IPO related, associated with a Leveraged Buyout or Management 
Buyout, spinoff related, or takeover related) and PURPOSE_ONGOING_BUSINESS (equal to 
unity if the purpose of the loan is for CP backup, capital expenditure, corporate purposes, debtor 
in possession, or working capital).  
We identify the value of these time-series and cross sectional variables for every 
observation in the pooled sample described in Section 2.1, and eliminate all observations for 
which any variable is missing, resulting in a pooled sample size of 36,345 observations. We then 
form 194 equally-weighted weekly portfolios using this sample. Table VIII presents descriptive 
statistics for this sample. Note that the descriptive statistics reported for the measures used in the 
tests we perform in Sections 2 and 3 differ somewhat from the descriptive statistics presented in 
Table I. This is due to the elimination of all observations for which any variable is missing, 
which results in a somewhat different sample.  In this sample, average weekly returns on equity, 
bank loans, the equity index and the loan index are all insignificantly different from zero, thereby 
removing the negative trend in returns shown in Table I. 
4.2. Cointegration Tests With Controls for Borrower- and Facility-Specific Characteristics 
In this section, we repeat the cointegration tests of the pooled sample detailed in Section 
2, with the added refinement of controls for borrower- and facility-specific characteristics. Hence 
we add the time-varying and cross sectional variables specified in Section 4.1 as independent 
variables to the return-generating processes in equations (1) and (2), and estimate the relationship 
for both loan market returns, in equation (1), and equity market returns, in equation (2), using the 
Generalized Method of Moments.  
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The results for the loan return generating function estimation of equation (1), presented in 
Table IX, indicate that the finding that equity markets lead loan markets in incorporating firm-
specific information continues to hold in our controlled setting. The estimates of the coefficients 
of equation (1) shown in the first column of Table IX show a statistically significant (at the 1% 
level) coefficient on lagged equity returns (RSt-1) in explaining loan returns. This supports the 
result presented in Table II, suggesting that the inclusion of control variables does not change the 
conclusion that equity markets tend to lead bank loan markets.  
However, the introduction of control variables provides some weak support for the 
explanatory power of loan returns in determining equity returns.  The results of the estimation of 
equation (2), presented in Table IX for the RSt dependent variable, show that both lagged and 
contemporaneous loan returns have a statistically significant (at the 10% level) impact on equity 
returns.  This differs from our finding in Table II, in which these coefficients were statistically 
insignificant. Thus, not only do we find that equity returns have explanatory power in 
determining loan returns, we also find that loan returns have explanatory power with regard to 
equity returns, albeit at the 10% level.  
The results for equation (1) also indicate a negative and statistically significant (at the 5% 
level) coefficient associated with the contemporaneous market index, and a positive and 
statistically significant (at the 1% level) coefficient associated with the loan index. There is a 
positive statistically significant coefficient associated with LNMV, at the 10% level, and a 
negative statistically significant coefficient, at the 1% level, associated with ARATE. There is a 
positive and statistically significant coefficient associated with ANNUAL_FEE, significant at the 
5% level.  
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The results for equation (2) also indicate statistically significant positive coefficients, at 
the 5% level or better, for contemporaneous and lagged market returns. The coefficient 
associated with loan index is positive and significant at the 10% level, while the coefficient 
associated with the year variable is negative and significant at the 5% level. The coefficient 
associated with LNMV is positive and significant at the 1% level, while the coefficient 
associated with LNDEBT is negative and significant at the 5% level. The coefficient associated 
with PENNYSTOCK is negative and significant at the 10% level, while the coefficient 
associated with CRATE is positive and significant at the 10% level. The coefficients associated 
with both LSPREAD and NUMBSYN are positive and significant at the 5% level.  
4.3. Direct Tests of the Liquidity and Private Information Hypotheses, With Controls 
for Borrower- and Facility-Specific Characteristics 
In this section, we directly test the liquidity and private information hypotheses for our 
sample with controls for borrower-and facility-specific characteristics. As we proceeded in 
Section 3.1, we use the sample median to divide our sample of 36,345 pooled observations into 
various subsamples in order to construct portfolios that differ systematically on the basis of 
liquidity and information content.  These portfolios are then used to re-estimate equations (1) and 
(2) to test for integration between the loan and equity markets.  
Table X reports the results of the GMM estimation of equation (1) for each subsample, 
testing whether lagged equity returns can explain loan returns. Column (7) of Table X reports the 
results for the more informationally intensive subsample of loans with financial covenants, as 
compared to Column (8) that shows the loans without financial covenants. Equity returns have 
significant (at the 10% level or better) coefficients in both subsamples, a result inconsistent with 
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the private information hypothesis. These results are consistent with our findings presented in 
Table V without borrower- and facility-specific controls. 
Table XI presents the results of the GMM estimation of equation (2) testing whether 
lagged loan returns can explain equity returns for each subsample of the database.  There is weak 
evidence in support of the private information hypothesis in that contemporaneous, but not 
lagged, loan returns have significant (at the 10% level only) explanatory power for 
informationally intensive loans with financial covenants (Column (7) of Table XI) and distressed 
loans (Column (5) of Table XI).  However, if the private information hypothesis is accurate, we 
would anticipate that the lagged equity returns would not have any explanatory power in 
determining loan returns for the informationally intensive distressed subsample and for the loan 
covenants subsample. Columns (5) and (7) in Table X show that this is not the case, thereby 
refuting the private information hypothesis. As we found in Section 3.1, lagged equity returns 
have significant (at the 1% level) coefficients in Column (5) of Table X for distressed loan 
portfolio returns, and in Column (7) for loan covenant portfolio returns, suggesting that equity 
markets lead loan markets in the most informationally intensive loan subsamples.  
However, the controlled sample tests provide support for the private information 
hypothesis in the absence of liquidity, confirming the conclusions presented in Section 3. That is, 
loan returns lead equity returns when equity volume is low, as shown by the statistically 
significant (at the 10% level or better) coefficients on lagged and contemporaneous loan returns 
in Column (9) of Table XI.  Moreover, when loan markets are liquid (e.g., a high number of loan 
quotes), contemporaneous loan returns have a statistically significant (at the 1% level) 
coefficient in explaining equity returns.   
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The results of the controlled estimation of equations (1) and (2) offer additional support 
for the liquidity hypothesis.  For virtually all subsamples, equity returns lead loan returns, as 
shown in Columns (1), (2), (4), (5) (7), (8), (9) and (10) of Table X.  The exception is for loan 
markets that are liquid; that is, loans with low spreads (Column (3) of Table X) and par loans 
(Column (6) of Table X).  Controlling for equity market liquidity suggests further support for the 
liquidity hypothesis. The significant (at the 5% level) coefficient on the lagged loan returns in 
Column (9) of Table XI is consistent with a leading information role for loan returns when equity 
markets are relatively illiquid. Thus, the results presented in Tables X and XI offer more support 
to the liquidity hypothesis than to the private information hypothesis. 
Granger causality tests provide additional evidence consistent with the liquidity 
hypothesis. Table XII presents the results of Granger causality tests performed using equations 
(3) and (4), with addition of the control variables listed in Table VIII. As shown in Table VII, for 
the model without control variables, Panel A of Table XII shows that equity returns Granger 
cause loan returns for most subsegments. There are only two exceptions to this result. In Column 
(3) of Table XII Panel A, the Granger causality tests are insignificant for loan portfolios 
comprised of loans with low spreads. These are the most liquid loan markets. Thus, when loan 
markets are liquid, lagged equity returns are insignificant in determining returns on bank loans. 
Moreover, Column (9) of Table XII Panel A, shows a similar result for illiquid equity markets. 
That is, when equity market trading volume is low, equity markets are relatively information 
inefficient and thus, lagged equity returns have no impact on loan returns. These results offer 
further support for the liquidity hypothesis. 
Panel B of Table XII offers support for the private information hypothesis in the absence 
of market liquidity. That is, Granger causality test results are insignificant for all subgroups, 
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except the portfolios comprised of loans to borrowers with low volume equity market trading 
(Column (9) of Panel B). For this group, loan returns Granger cause equity returns. Thus, when 
equity markets are illiquid, the private information inherent in bank loans becomes significant (at 
the 5% level) in determining equity returns. Therefore, the controlled model results support the 
conclusions of Sections 2 and 3 – the private information hypothesis is only upheld in the 
absence of market liquidity. 
 
5. Conclusions 
To our knowledge, this is the first study to compare the informational efficiency of equity 
markets to syndicated bank loan secondary markets.  We utilize three methodologies to conduct 
our tests: GMM cointegration tests of the return generating function for each market 
individually, Granger causality tests and estimation of abnormal returns on portfolios constructed 
using lagged market data.   
We formulate two hypotheses.  The private information hypothesis posits that loan 
markets lead equity markets because members of loan syndicates have access to superior, private 
information about borrowing firms. The liquidity hypothesis states that equity markets lead loan 
markets because loan markets are relatively illiquid as compared to public equity markets.  Our 
results find support for the liquidity hypothesis.  However, in the absence of liquidity (i.e., for 
relatively illiquid equity markets), we find support for the private information hypothesis. 
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Table I. Descriptive statistics, return data. The mean, median, and standard deviation are reported for weekly 
portfolios consisting of equally weighted averages of all variables. Variable definitions are as follows: RBt is the 
weekly loan return. RSt is the weekly equity return. RLt is the weekly loan index return. RMt is the weekly equity 
index return. RDt is the weekly T-Bill return. Yt is the year of the observation. NBAt is sum of the number of bids and 
asks for the loan. SPRDt is the difference between average ask and average bid loan price, divided by the average of 
these two values. Vt is the volume of trades on the equity market. ***, **, * denote t-test significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation 
RBt            -0.0008*** -0.0004 0.0030 
RSt            -0.0005 -0.0037 0.0426 
RLt            -0.0001 0.0001 0.0030 
RMt            -0.0014 -0.0018 0.0303 
RDt             0.0010*** 0.0011 0.0005 
Yt       2000.8454*** 2001.0000 1.2864 
NBAt             8.0358*** 8.1314 0.5782 
SPRDt             0.0164*** 0.0160 0.0028 
Vt  931,400.2427*** 877,028.3537 427,707.2133 
Sample Size         194  
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Table II. Cointegration Tests. We use the Generalized Method of Moments to estimate  
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for the sample of 194 weekly portfolios of equally weighted returns. Variable definitions are as follows: RBt is the 
loan return. RSt is the equity return. RLt is the loan index return. RMt is the equity index return. RDt is the T-Bill 
return. Yt is the year of the observation. NBAt is sum of the number of bids and asks for the loan. SPRDt is the 
difference between average ask and average bid, divided by the average of these two values. Vt is the volume of 
trades on the equity market. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
  
 Eq. (1) (RBt is dependent) Eq. (2) (RSt is dependent) 
Variable    Coefficient Standard Error     Coefficient Standard Error 
Intercept      -0.0622 0.6393     -14.9279* 8.6444 
RBt         1.4794 1.2443 
RBt-1        0.418*** 0.0935      -0.6250 1.3938 
RSt       0.0085 0.0068   
RSt-1       0.0121** 0.0059       0.1078 0.1092 
RSt-2       0.0089 0.0056      -0.0420 0.0813 
RMt      -0.0130 0.0085       1.0138*** 0.0811 
RMt-1       0.0036 0.0091       0.1369 0.1323 
RMt-2      -0.0081 0.0068       0.1615 0.1078 
RLt       0.2738*** 0.0712       1.2573 0.7811 
RDt      -0.4777 0.7485      21.4331*      11.5885 
Yt       0.0000 0.0003       0.0074* 0.0043 
NBAt       0.0001 0.0003      -0.0007 0.0035 
SPRDt      -0.0492 0.0709      -0.2512 0.8556 
Vt       0.0000 0.0000       0.0000 0.0000 
Adjusted-R2       0.4959        0.5689  
N         194          194  
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Table III. Bivariate Granger Causality Tests. We test causality between loan and equity return using OLS 
estimates of the following models: 
 
,1211 ttttt RSRBRB εββα +++= −−    (3) 
.1211 ttttt RBRSRS εββα +++= −−   (4)  
 
Each model is estimated twice: restricted, through excluding the variables RSt-1 and RBt-1 from equations (3) and (4), 
respectively, and unrestricted where these variables are not excluded. We then compare the sum of squared residuals 
for the unrestricted and restricted models, and conduct F-tests and asymptotically equivalent tests of the null 
hypothesis that β2 = 0. Significance denotes a finding of Granger causality. Variable definitions are as follows: RBt is 
the loan return. RSt is the equity return. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) 
 
 
Variable 
Do equity returns Granger 
cause loan returns? 
Eq. (3) (RBt is dependent)
Do loan returns Granger 
cause equity returns? 
Eq. (4) (RSt is dependent) 
Number of Observations                194               194 
SSE restricted              0.0011                0.3389 
SSE unrestricted              0.0010                0.3369 
F-test            29.5525***                1.1727 
Asymptotically equivalent test            30.0167***                1.1911 
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Table IV. Abnormal Returns on Long/Short Portfolios. For every week in the time period, we separately form 
equally weighted portfolios consisting of loan (equity) return observations for which the lag equity (loan) return in 
excess of the T-bill return is positive or negative. We then subtract the loan (equity) return on the negative lag equity 
(loan) portfolio from the return on the positive lag equity (loan) to simulate a portfolio consisting of long positions 
in loans (stocks) with positive lag equity (loan) returns and short positions in loans (stocks) with negative lag equity 
(loan) returns. We report the long/short portfolio returns in excess of the tbill return, the t-statistic for a test whether 
these excess portfolio returns are significantly different from zero, and the alpha associated with the following 
regression: 
,1 tttt RIRP εβα ++=     
 
where RPt is the return on the excess long/short loan (equity) portfolio and RIt is the return on the excess loan 
(equity) index portfolio. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
Portfolio Mean Alpha 
Long/short loan portfolios formed using lag equity returns 0.0006** 0.0005 
Long/short equity portfolios formed using lag loan returns   0.0040 0.0040 
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Table V. Subsample Tests, Loan Return Dependent Variable. We use the Generalized Method of Moments to estimate:  
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for 194 weekly portfolios of equally weighted returns, formed using the following subsamples of observations: Loan observations with quotes below (low loan 
quotes) or above (high loan quotes) the median; loan observations with loan quote spreads below (low loan spreads) or above (high loan spreads) the median; 
loans with price below $70 (distressed loans) or above $90 (par loans); loans and without financial covenants; and observations with equity volume below (low 
equity volume) or above (high equity volume) the median. Variable definitions are as follows: RBt is the loan return. RSt is the equity return. RLt is the loan index 
return. RMt is the equity index return. RDt is the T-Bill return. Yt is the year of the observation. NBAt is sum of the number of bids and asks for the loan. SPRDt is 
the difference between average ask and average bid, divided by the average of these two values. Vt is the volume of trades on the equity market. ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 
 
Variable 
Low number 
of loan 
quotes 
High number
of loan  
quotes 
 
Low loan 
spreads 
 
High loan 
spreads 
Distressed 
loans 
(Price<=70)
 
Par loans 
(Price>=90) 
Loans with
financial 
covenants 
Loans without 
financial 
covenants 
 
Low equity
volume 
 
High equity
volume 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Intercept -0.1596  1.7364*  0.2916*** -0.1885 -2.4428 -0.1209  0.0606 -0.5212  0.7569 -0.7663 
RBt-1  0.4472***  0.2766**  0.1742*  0.4131***  0.0909  0.3626***  0.3411***  0.2334**  0.3692***  0.2675* 
RSt  0.0032  0.0141* -0.002**  0.0122  0.0146  0.0029  0.0132* -0.0040  0.0079  0.0084 
RSt-1  0.0106  0.017**  0.0025**  0.0140**  0.0575***  0.0034  0.0109*  0.0015  0.0144***  0.0095 
RSt-2 -0.0005  0.02***  0.0001  0.0119*  0.0217  0.0022  0.0144**  0.0101  0.0083*  0.0141* 
RMt -0.006 -0.0222**  0.0027** -0.0243* -0.1977 -0.0028 -0.0204**  0.0061 -0.0050 -0.0227* 
RMt-1 -0.0009  0.0026 -0.0005  0.0125  0.0398  0.0007  0.0049  0.0071 -0.0018  0.0093 
RMt-2  0.0050 -0.0245*** -0.0001 -0.0117 -0.0243 -0.0012 -0.0162**  0.0103 -0.0062 -0.0108 
RLt  0.2437***  0.3086***  0.0227***  0.5012***  1.9100  0.0660***  0.2721***  0.3685***  0.2154***  0.3702*** 
RDt  0.4855 -2.9095** -0.2641*** -0.7912 -7.2430 -0.0997 -0.7272 -1.0819 -0.8687 -0.7274 
Yt  0.0001 -0.0009* -0.0001***  0.0001  0.0012  0.0001  0.0000  0.0003 -0.0004  0.0004 
NBAt -0.0024  0.0006  0.0001*** -0.0001  0.0016  0.0000  0.0001  0.0000  0.0003 -0.0002 
SPRDt  0.0657 -0.2134**  0.2588** -0.0638 -0.0140  0.0525 -0.0797 -0.1035 -0.0829 -0.1364** 
Vt  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Adjusted-R2  0.377  0.4982 0.3306  0.4836  0.1054  0.3977  0.4520  0.1882  0.3582  0.3841 
N 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 
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Table VI. Subsample Tests, Equity Return Dependent Variable. We use the Generalized Method of Moments to estimate:  
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for 194 weekly portfolios of equally weighted returns, formed using the following subsamples of observations: Loan observations with quotes below (low loan 
quotes) or above (high loan quotes) the median; loan observations with loan quote spreads below (low loan spreads) or above (high loan spreads) the median; 
loans with price below $70 (distressed loans) or above $90 (par loans); loans and without financial covenants; and observations with equity volume below (low 
equity volume) or above (high equity volume) the median. Variable definitions are as follows: RBt is the loan return. RSt is the equity return. RLt is the loan index 
return. RMt is the equity index return. RDt is the T-Bill return. Yt is the year of the observation. NBAt is sum of the number of bids and asks for the loan. SPRDt is 
the difference between average ask and average bid, divided by the average of these two values. Vt is the volume of trades on the equity market. ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
        
 
 
Variable 
Low number 
of loan 
quotes 
High number
of loan  
quotes 
 
Low loan 
spreads 
 
High loan 
spreads 
Distressed 
loans 
(Price<=70)
 
Par loans 
(Price>=90) 
Loans with
financial 
covenants 
Loans without 
financial 
covenants 
 
Low equity 
volume 
 
High equity
volume 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Intercept -16.5090** -15.5341*  -9.4138* -21.3647* -65.7609 -23.4039*** -17.2679** -2.0686 -12.3284** -27.0682** 
RBt    0.6070    1.4082*  -7.9265**     1.5025    0.2423    2.7826    1.7795 -0.4316    1.1464    1.0021 
RBt-1   -1.3691    0.1804   6.6443*   -0.9537   -0.1615  -1.7944  -0.3138 -0.0232   -2.7836*    0.9707 
RSt-1    0.0499    0.1017   0.0827    0.0928   -0.0676   0.1041   0.1166  0.0103    0.1896***    0.0821 
RSt-2   -0.0164  -0.0509   0.0200   -0.0588   -0.0344   0.0289  -0.0654 -0.0572    0.0272   -0.0578 
RMt    0.9804***   1.0389***   0.8116***    1.1877***    1.4107***   0.9445***   1.0236***  1.0461***    0.6806***    1.3167*** 
RMt-1    0.1689   0.1903   0.0840    0.208    0.4927   0.0824   0.1247  0.2787**   -0.0172    0.2766* 
RMt-2    0.1113   0.2079*   0.0098    0.2869*    0.4698   0.0456   0.1902*  0.2282**   -0.0420    0.2761* 
RLt    1.9876**   0.7753   1.2877***    1.4783    6.8840   1.3508**   0.7183  3.6028**    0.9199    0.8934 
RDt  18.9031* 18.2081* 12.0016*  31.3573** 38.5570 23.0343** 20.3589** 17.6174  12.1305  31.7183* 
Yt    0.0083**   0.0077*   0.0047*    0.0107*   0.0329   0.0117***   0.0086**  0.0010    0.0062**    0.0135** 
NBAt  -0.0178   0.0021   0.0014  -0.0015  -0.0043  -0.0026  -0.0028  0.0134**   -0.0025    0.0029 
SPRDt  -0.4703   0.6218   8.2903  -0.7287  -0.1594   2.0288  -0.6495  0.5801   -0.2445    0.6794 
Vt    0.0000   0.0000   0.0000    0.0000   0.0000    0.0000    0.0000  0.0000**     0.0000    0.0000 
Adjusted-R2   0.5428   0.5352  0.6883   0.4327   0.0463   0.6848   0.5760  0.3929    0.4323    0.5463 
N 194 194 194  194  194  194  194  194    194   194 
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Table VII. Bivariate Granger Causality Tests. We test causality between loan and equity return using OLS estimates of the following models: 
 
,1211 ttttt RSRBRB εββα +++= −−       (3) 
.121 tttitt RBRSRS εββα +++= −−      (4)  
 
Each model is estimated twice: restricted, through excluding the variables RSt-1 and RBt-1 from equations (3) and (4), respectively, and unrestricted where these 
variables are not excluded. We then compare the sum of squared residuals for the unrestricted and restricted models, and conduct F-tests and asymptotically 
equivalent tests of the null hypothesis that β2 = 0. Significance denotes a finding of Granger causality. Test results are reported for portfolios formed using the 
following subsamples of observations: Loan observations with quotes below (low loan quotes) or above (high loan quotes) the median; loan observations with 
loan quote spreads below (low loan spreads) or above (high loan spreads) the median; loans with price below $70 (distressed loans) or above $90 (par loans); 
loans and without financial covenants; and observations with equity volume below (low equity volume) or above (high equity volume) the median. Variable 
definitions are as follows: RBt is the loan return. RSt is the equity return. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Loan Return Dependent Variable. . Significance denotes that lagged weekly equity returns Granger cause weekly loans returns. 
 
 
 
Variable 
Low number 
of loan 
quotes 
High number
of loan  
quotes 
 
Low loan 
spreads 
 
High loan 
spreads 
Distressed 
loans 
(Price<=70)
 
Par loans 
(Price>=90)
Loans with
financial 
covenants 
Loans without 
financial 
covenants 
 
Low equity
volume 
 
High equity
volume 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Number of Observations 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 
SSE restricted 0.0010 0.0025 0.0000 0.0041 0.3875 0.0001 0.0014 0.0036 0.0011 0.0029 
SSE unrestricted 0.0009 0.0022 0.0000 0.0036 0.3601 0.0001 0.0013 0.0035 0.0010 0.0026 
F-test 17.2904*** 27.5198*** 7.6570*** 27.2250*** 14.5178*** 17.7863*** 25.3887*** 3.2990* 18.2292*** 19.9260*** 
Asymptotically equivalent test 17.5620*** 27.9520*** 7.7773*** 27.6526*** 14.7459*** 18.0657*** 25.7875*** 3.3508* 18.5156*** 20.2390*** 
 
Panel B. Equity Return Dependent Variable. Significance denotes that lagged weekly loan returns Granger cause weekly equity returns. 
 
 
 
Variable 
Low number 
of loan 
quotes 
High number
of loan  
quotes 
 
Low loan 
spreads 
 
High loan 
spreads 
Distressed 
loans 
(Price<=70)
 
Par loans 
(Price>=90)
Loans with
financial 
covenants 
Loans without 
financial 
covenants 
 
Low equity
volume 
 
High equity
volume 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Number of Observations 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 
SSE restricted 0.3486 0.3716 0.1694 0.6617 6.2635 0.2419 0.3301 0.5727 0.2175 0.5862 
SSE unrestricted 0.3431 0.3712 0.1690 0.6565 6.2478 0.2416 0.3289 0.5716 0.2108 0.5859 
F-test 3.0748* 0.2027 0.4046 1.5228 0.4814 0.2670 0.6889 0.3518 6.0980** 0.1048 
Asymptotically equivalent test 3.1231* 0.2059 0.4110 1.5467 0.4890 0.2712 0.6998 0.3573 6.1938** 0.1064 
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Table VIII. Descriptive Statistics, Return, Facility-Specific, and Borrower-Specific Data. The mean, median, and standard 
deviation are reported for weekly portfolios consisting of equally weighted averages of all variables. Variables definitions are as 
follows: RBt is the loan return. RSt is the equity return. RLt is the loan index return. RMt is the equity index return. RDt is the T-Bill 
return. Yt is the year of the observation. NBAt is sum of the number of bids and asks for the loan. SPRDt is the difference between 
average ask and average bid, divided by the average of these two values. Vt is the volume of trades on the equity market. PROB_KMV 
is the implied probability of default on the date of the observation. LNMV is the natural logarithm of the borrower’s market value on 
the date of the observation. LNDEBT is the natural logarithm of the borrower’s debt for the year of the observation. LEVERAGE is 
the borrower’s ratio of total debt to total assets. INCOMTOA is the borrower’s ratio of operating income before depreciation to total assets. 
EPS is the borrower’s earning per share. PENNYSTOCK is an indicator variable that is equal to unity if the price of the borrower’s 
stock is less than $1 on the date of the observation. ARATE, BRATE, and CRATE are indicator variables that are equal to unity if the 
debt rating is between A3 and Aaa, B3 and Baa1, and C and Caa, respectively, and zero otherwise. LNDEALSIZE and 
LNFACILITYSIZE are the natural logarithm of the deal and facility size, respectively. LSPREAD is the basis point coupon spread 
over LIBOR plus the annual fee and upfront fee, spread over the life of the loan. UPFRONT_FEE is the upfront fee, ANNUAL_FEE 
is the annual fee, and COMMITMENT_FEE is the commitment fee charged on unused portions of the loan. MATURITY is the 
number of days until the loan facility matures, as specified at initiation. SECURED_YES is an indicator variable equal to unity if the 
facility is designated as securitized. LOAN_REVOLVER and LOAN_TERM are indicator variables that are equal to unity if the loan 
is a revolver or term loan, respectively. REFINANCING_YES is an indicator variable that is equal to unity if the loan facility is 
designated as being for refinancing. FINANCIAL_COVENANT is an indicator variable that is equal to unity if there are any of 
several financial covenants associated with the loan facility. NONFINANCIAL_COVENANT is an indicator variable that is equal to 
unity if there are any of several nonfinancial covenants associated with the loan facility. PPC is an indicator variable that is equal to 
unity if the loan facility has a performance pricing covenant. NUMBSYN is the number of lenders in the syndicate providing the loan. 
PURPOSE_CHANGE_OF_CONTROL is an indicator variable is an indicator variable that is equal to unity if the purpose of the loan 
is as an acquisition line, IPO related, associated with a Leveraged Buyout or Management Buyout, spinoff related, or takeover related. 
PURPOSE_ONGOING_BUSINESS is an indicator variable that is equal to unity if the purpose of the loan is for CP backup, capital 
expenditure, corporate purposes, debtor in possession, or working capital. ***, **, * denote t-test significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
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Variable Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation
RBt           -0.0001 0.0000 0.0024
RSt            0.0024 0.0010 0.0388
RLt           -0.0001 0.0001 0.0030
RMt           -0.0014 -0.0018 0.0303
RDt            0.0010*** 0.0011 0.0005
Yt      2000.8454*** 2001.0000 1.2864
NBAt            8.1797*** 8.2872 0.6826
SPRDt            0.0140*** 0.0131 0.0032
Vt 813,717.3311*** 700,590.1215 458,933.2086
PROB_KMV            0.0599*** 0.0481 0.0335
LNMV          20.4262*** 20.4101 0.1867
LNDEBT          20.6758*** 20.6870 0.1429
LEVERAGE            0.5856*** 0.5566 0.0764
INCOMETOA            0.1208*** 0.1203 0.0054
EPS           -1.4910*** -0.8983 1.9041
PENNYSTOCK            0.0266*** 0.0189 0.0244
ARATE            0.0067*** 0.0049 0.0068
BRATE            0.7066*** 0.7336 0.0653
CRATE            0.0974*** 0.0987 0.0164
NOTRATED            0.1843*** 0.1441 0.0688
LNDEALSIZE          20.5270*** 20.5351 0.0613
LNFACILITYSIZE          19.4042*** 19.4099 0.0733
LSPREAD        281.6256*** 281.5558 4.3159
UPFRONT_FEE          23.6248*** 22.7834 3.1679
ANNUAL_FEE          13.8602*** 13.7677 1.2354
COMMITMENT_FEE            5.0748*** 5.1069 0.7238
MATURITY     2,288.1402*** 2,307.9445 102.9828
SECURED_YES            0.8833*** 0.8810 0.0235
LOAN_REVOLVER            0.1958*** 0.2018 0.0263
LOAN_TERM            0.7453*** 0.7384 0.0269
LOAN_OTHER            0.0588*** 0.0578 0.0104
REFINANCING_YES            0.6978*** 0.7465 0.1371
FINANCIAL_COVENANT            0.8613*** 0.8631 0.0304
NONFINANCIAL_COVENANT            0.9324*** 0.9338 0.0249
PPC            0.3620*** 0.3523 0.1037
NUMBSYN          17.1816*** 17.3294 0.7316
PURPOSE_CHANGE_OF_CONTROL            0.4975*** 0.5110 0.0618
PURPOSE_ONGOING_BUSINESS            0.1511*** 0.1234 0.0620
Sample Size             194 
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Table IX. Cointegration Tests With Facility-Specific and Borrower-Specific Controls. We use the Generalized Method of 
Moments to repeat the cointegration tests reported in Tables II with loan facility-and borrower-specific control variables. Variable 
definitions are as follows: RBt is the loan return. RSt is the equity return. RLt is the loan index return. RMt is the equity index return. RDt 
is the T-Bill return. Yt is the year of the observation. NBAt is sum of the number of bids and asks for the loan. SPRDt is the difference 
between average ask and average bid, divided by the average of these two values. Vt is the volume of trades on the equity market. 
PROB_KMV is the implied probability of default on the date of the observation. LNMV is the natural logarithm of the borrower’s 
market value on the date of the observation. LNDEBT is the natural logarithm of the borrower’s debt for the year of the observation. 
LEVERAGE is the borrower’s ratio of total debt to total assets for the year of the observation. INCOMTOA is the borrower’s ratio of 
operating income before depreciation to total assets for the year of the observation. EPS is the borrower’s earning per share for the 
year of the observation. PENNYSTOCK is an indicator variable that is equal to unity if the price of the borrower’s stock is less than 
$1 on the date of the observation. ARATE, BRATE, and CRATE are indicator variables that are equal to unity if the debt rating is 
between A3 and Aaa, B3 and Baa1, and C and Caa, respectively, and zero otherwise. LNDEALSIZE and LNFACILITYSIZE are the 
natural logarithm of the deal and facility size, respectively. LSPREAD is the basis point coupon spread over LIBOR plus the annual 
fee and upfront fee, spread over the life of the loan. UPFRONT_FEE is the upfront fee, ANNUAL_FEE is the annual fee, and 
COMMITMENT_FEE is the commitment fee charged on unused portions of the loan. MATURITY is the number of days until the 
loan facility matures, as specified at initiation. SECURED_YES is an indicator variable equal to unity if the facility is designated as 
securitized. LOAN_REVOLVER and LOAN_TERM are indicator variables that are equal to unity if the loan is a revolver or term 
loan, respectively. REFINANCING_YES is an indicator variable that is equal to unity if the loan facility is designated as being for 
refinancing. FINANCIAL_COVENANT is an indicator variable that is equal to unity if there are any of several financial covenants 
associated with the loan facility. NONFINANCIAL_COVENANT is an indicator variable that is equal to unity if there are any of 
several nonfinancial covenants associated with the loan facility. PPC is an indicator variable that is equal to unity if the loan facility 
has a performance pricing covenant. NUMBSYN is the number of lenders in the syndicate providing the loan. 
PURPOSE_CHANGE_OF_CONTROL is an indicator variable is an indicator variable that is equal to unity if the purpose of the loan 
is as an acquisition line, IPO related, associated with a Leveraged Buyout or Management Buyout, spinoff related, or takeover related. 
PURPOSE_ONGOING_BUSINESS is an indicator variable that is equal to unity if the purpose of the loan is for CP backup, capital 
expenditure, corporate purposes, debtor in possession, or working capital. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
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 RBt is dependent RSt is dependent 
Variable    Coefficient Standard Error     Coefficient Standard Error
Intercept      -0.0908 2.7910      80.3905** 34.6727 
RBt         2.6744* 1.5355 
RBt-1       0.1859* 0.0972      -2.6319* 1.4616 
RSt       0.0127* 0.0071   
RSt-1       0.0144*** 0.0053      -0.0757 0.0893 
RSt-2       0.0036 0.0049      -0.1074 0.0888 
RMt      -0.0183** 0.0080       0.9093*** 0.0752 
RMt-1      -0.0082 0.0073       0.2193** 0.1087 
RMt-2      -0.0038 0.0058       0.2618** 0.1124 
RLt       0.1584*** 0.0495       1.0947* 0.6292 
RDt      -2.7568 1.7018    -14.9754 24.5479 
Yt      -0.0001 0.0014      -0.0390** 0.0173 
NBAt      -0.0004 0.0005       0.0089 0.0075 
SPRDt      -0.2161 0.1385      -2.1825 1.9784 
Vt       0.0000 0.0000       0.0000 0.0000 
PROB_KMV       0.0179 0.0137       0.2159 0.2322 
LNMV       0.0055* 0.0028       0.0991*** 0.0351 
LNDEBT       0.0014 0.0050      -0.1393** 0.0695 
LEVERAGE       0.0122 0.0228      -0.3713 0.3052 
INCOMETOA      -0.0446 0.0652      -0.8149 0.9322 
EPS      -0.0001 0.0002      -0.0024 0.0023 
PENNYSTOCK      -0.0028 0.0147      -0.3577* 0.1970 
ARATE      -0.2869*** 0.1017       1.1517 1.3241 
BRATE      -0.0131 0.0167       0.2657 0.2343 
CRATE       0.0054 0.0274       0.4869* 0.2546 
LNDEALSIZE      -0.0109 0.0128       0.0464 0.1540 
LNFACILITYSIZE       0.0179 0.0139      -0.1598 0.1686 
LSPREAD       0.0001 0.0001       0.0024** 0.0010 
UPFRONT_FEE      -0.0002 0.0002        0.004 0.0031 
ANNUAL_FEE       0.0008** 0.0003      -0.0062 0.0046 
COMMITMENT_FEE       0.0003 0.0005       0.0087 0.0070 
MATURITY       0.0000 0.0000       0.0001 0.0001 
SECURED_YES       0.0251 0.0226      -0.2806 0.2311 
LOAN_REVOLVER       0.0151 0.0331      -0.2025 0.3594 
LOAN_TERM       0.0414 0.0458      -0.4004 0.4152 
REFINANCING_YES       0.0187 0.0132      -0.2193 0.1815 
FINANCIAL_COVENANT      -0.0086 0.0210      -0.0709 0.3049 
NONFINANCIAL_COVENANT       0.0176 0.0227       0.2656 0.3073 
PPC      -0.0062 0.0151       0.2478 0.2141 
NUMBSYN      -0.0006 0.0006       0.0145** 0.0065 
PURPOSE_CHANGE_OF_CONTROL      -0.0065 0.0168      -0.1412 0.1962 
PURPOSE_ONGOING_BUSINESS      -0.0194 0.0210       0.2919 0.2166 
Adjusted-R2       0.5466        0.6225  
N         194          194  
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Table X. Subsample Tests, Loan Return Dependent Variable, With Facility-Specific and Borrower-Specific Controls. We use the Generalized Method of 
Moments to repeat the cointegration tests reported in Tables V with loan facility-and borrower-specific control variables. The portfolios of equally weighted 
returns are formed using the following subsamples of observations: Loan observations with quotes below (low loan quotes) or above (high loan quotes) the 
median; loan observations with loan quote spreads below (low loan spreads) or above (high loan spreads) the median; loans with price below $70 (distressed 
loans) or above $90 (par loans); loans and without financial covenants; and observations with equity volume below (low equity volume) or above (high equity 
volume) the median. Variable definitions are as follows: RBt is the loan return. RSt is the equity return. RLt is the loan index return. RMt is the equity index return. 
RDt is the T-Bill return. Yt is the year of the observation. NBAt is sum of the number of bids and asks for the loan. SPRDt is the difference between average ask and 
average bid, divided by the average of these two values. Vt is the volume of trades on the equity market. PROB_KMV is the implied probability of default on the 
date of the observation. LNMV is the natural logarithm of the borrower’s market value on the date of the observation. LNDEBT is the natural logarithm of the 
borrower’s debt for the year of the observation. LEVERAGE is the borrower’s ratio of total debt to total assets for the year of the observation. INCOMTOA is 
the borrower’s ratio of operating income before depreciation to total assets for the year of the observation. EPS is the borrower’s earning per share for the year of 
the observation. PENNYSTOCK is an indicator variable that is equal to unity if the price of the borrower’s stock is less than $1 on the date of the observation. 
ARATE, BRATE, and CRATE are indicator variables that are equal to unity if the debt rating is between A3 and Aaa, B3 and Baa1, and C and Caa, respectively, 
and zero otherwise. LNDEALSIZE and LNFACILITYSIZE are the natural logarithm of the deal and facility size, respectively. LSPREAD is the basis point 
coupon spread over LIBOR plus the annual fee and upfront fee, spread over the life of the loan. UPFRONT_FEE is the upfront fee, ANNUAL_FEE is the annual 
fee, and COMMITMENT_FEE is the commitment fee charged on unused portions of the loan. MATURITY is the number of days until the loan facility matures, 
as specified at initiation. SECURED_YES is an indicator variable equal to unity if the facility is designated as securitized. LOAN_REVOLVER and 
LOAN_TERM are indicator variables that are equal to unity if the loan is a revolver or term loan, respectively. REFINANCING_YES is an indicator variable 
that is equal to unity if the loan facility is designated as being for refinancing. FINANCIAL_COVENANT is an indicator variable that is equal to unity if there 
are any of several financial covenants associated with the loan facility. NONFINANCIAL_COVENANT is an indicator variable that is equal to unity if there are 
any of several nonfinancial covenants associated with the loan facility. PPC is an indicator variable that is equal to unity if the loan facility has a performance 
pricing covenant. NUMBSYN is the number of lenders in the syndicate providing the loan. PURPOSE_CHANGE_OF_CONTROL is an indicator variable is an 
indicator variable that is equal to unity if the purpose of the loan is as an acquisition line, IPO related, associated with a Leveraged Buyout or Management 
Buyout, spinoff related, or takeover related. PURPOSE_ONGOING_BUSINESS is an indicator variable that is equal to unity if the purpose of the loan is for CP 
backup, capital expenditure, corporate purposes, debtor in possession, or working capital. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Variable 
Low number  
of loan 
quotes 
High number 
of loan  
quotes 
 
Low loan 
spreads 
 
High loan 
spreads 
Distressed 
loans 
(Price<=70) 
 
Par loans 
(Price>=90) 
Loans with 
financial 
covenants 
Loans without 
financial 
covenants 
 
Low equity 
volume 
 
High equity 
volume 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Intercept       4.1653**       0.2547       0.0227       2.4512     -82.4894       0.4026      -1.0747       0.3935       3.0284*       0.8421 
RBt-1       0.2929***       0.1292       0.0015       0.2419***      -0.0003       0.1015       0.0997       0.1011       0.1799*       0.3307*** 
RSt       0.0117       0.0234***      -0.0017       0.0133       0.0659***        0.002        0.015**       0.0014       0.0144*       0.0205*** 
RSt-1        0.014*       0.0214***       0.0009       0.0175***       0.0766***       0.0022       0.0148***       0.0144*       0.0058       0.0108** 
RSt-2      -0.0013       0.0086       0.0012       0.0021       0.0219       0.0024        0.007       0.0254**       0.0045       0.0044 
RMt      -0.0207**      -0.0242***       0.0018      -0.0236**       -0.303**      -0.0038      -0.0239***       -0.004      -0.0077      -0.0357*** 
RMt-1      -0.0155*      -0.0137*      -0.0001      -0.0109      -0.0954       0.0008      -0.0074      -0.0101       0.0004      -0.0008 
RMt-2      -0.0029      -0.0128*       -0.001      -0.0026       0.0915      -0.0019      -0.0074      -0.0007      -0.0039      -0.0052 
RLt       0.1382**       0.2181***       0.0106       0.2645***       1.0054       0.0573***       0.1536***       0.2179*        0.182***        0.203*** 
RDt      -1.2349      -2.7116      -0.1283       -0.389      33.2694      -1.8841**      -3.8519        4.382       -1.029      -0.4171 
Yt       -0.002**      -0.0001       0.0000      -0.0012       0.0416      -0.0002       0.0005      -0.0004      -0.0015*      -0.0004 
NBAt      -0.0071*       0.0001       0.0000      -0.0011       0.0037       0.0001      -0.0002      -0.0014      -0.0002       0.0003 
SPRDt       0.0812      -0.6678***       0.4033*      -0.2932**      -0.3998**       -0.013      -0.3725**      -0.3606*      -0.3783***       0.1485* 
Vt       0.0000       0.0000       0.0000       0.0000       0.0000*       0.0000       0.0000       0.0000       0.0000       0.0000 
PROB_KMV       0.0029       0.0575***       0.0008        0.013      -0.1299      -0.0136       0.0346**       0.0538       0.0099       0.0063 
LNMV       0.0043*       0.0019      -0.0004       0.0059*        -0.03       0.0016       0.0068***       0.0003       0.0018      -0.0004 
LNDEBT       0.0025       -0.007       0.0000       0.0059       0.0113       0.0022      -0.0081       0.0081*       0.0006       0.0037 
LEVERAGE      -0.0026       0.0158      -0.0014       0.0333*      -0.0804       0.0085       0.0423*       0.0134       0.0035      -0.0016 
INCOMETOA       0.0568      -0.1175**      -0.0004      -0.1114      -0.6252*        0.022      -0.1009       0.0608       0.0381      -0.0399* 
EPS      -0.0002*       0.0004      -0.0001      -0.0001       0.0001      -0.0001       0.0009      -0.0002**      -0.0002       0.0000 
PENNYSTOCK       0.0176       0.0055       0.0001       0.0000       0.0321       0.0014      -0.0063       0.0159      -0.0007      -0.0162* 
ARATE      -0.0952**      -0.0304      -0.0039      -0.0352       0.0001      -0.0527*      -0.3255***       0.0001       0.0198      -0.0448 
BRATE      -0.0081      -0.0366**      -0.0008       0.0111       0.0705      -0.0036      -0.0032      -0.0019       0.0024      -0.0068 
CRATE       0.0002       0.0105       0.0044      -0.0402       -0.131       0.0095       0.0338       0.0059       0.0121      -0.0288** 
LNDEALSIZE      -0.0102       0.0075       0.0019**      -0.0237*       0.0689      -0.0072      -0.0094       0.0055       -0.014***      -0.0001 
LNFACILITYSIZE      -0.0017      -0.0063       0.0000       0.0089      -0.0684       0.0048       0.0214       0.0009       0.0123***       -0.006 
LSPREAD       0.0000      -0.0001       0.0000**       0.0001      -0.0001       0.0000       0.0002       0.0000       0.0001**       0.0000 
UPFRONT_FEE       0.0000      -0.0001       0.0000**       0.0000       0.0014       0.0000      -0.0003       0.0000       0.0001       0.0001* 
ANNUAL_FEE       0.0001       0.0001       0.0000***       0.0001      -0.0005       0.0001       0.0008***       0.0000       0.0000       0.0001* 
COMMITMENT_FEE      -0.0007**      -0.0001       0.0000       0.0006      -0.0023       0.0001      -0.0003       0.0002       0.0000      -0.0001 
MATURITY       0.0000       0.0000       0.0000       0.0000      -0.0001       0.0000       0.0000*       0.0000       0.0000       0.0000 
SECURED_YES       0.0276*       0.0081       0.0067***       0.0056      -0.0762       0.0074       0.0128      -0.0179      -0.0059      -0.0086 
LOAN_REVOLVER       0.0164       0.0312       0.0059*      -0.0472       0.0514      -0.0109       0.0751**       0.0104      -0.0097       0.0529*** 
LOAN_TERM       0.0085       0.0249       0.0058**      -0.0395       0.1559      -0.0057       0.0767**       0.0289       -0.003       0.0512*** 
REFINANCING_YES       0.0061       0.0086      -0.0007      -0.0092      -0.1551        0.003        0.018        0.015       0.0111*       0.0033 
FINANCIAL_COVENANT       0.0078        0.018      -0.0022      -0.0191       0.0262       0.0107       0.0001       0.0001       0.0026       -0.011 
NONFINANCIAL_COVENANT      -0.0084       0.0005       0.0054**       0.0038      -0.0511      -0.0073      -0.1189      -0.0202*       0.0006       0.0126 
PPC      -0.0067      -0.0357***      -0.0004       0.0083       -0.157      -0.0007      -0.0026      -0.0075       0.0014      -0.0138*** 
NUMBSYN      -0.0002      -0.0002       0.0000       0.0003       0.0037       0.0001       -0.001      -0.0001       0.0001      -0.0002 
PURPOSE_CHANGE_OF_CONTROL       0.0063       0.0008      -0.0004      -0.0051       -0.054      -0.0014       0.0117      -0.0042       0.0038       -0.006 
PURPOSE_ONGOING_BUSINESS       0.0121       0.0059        0.003      -0.0207      -0.0548       0.0028       -0.014       0.0125      -0.0153**       0.0021 
Adjusted-R2       0.4699       0.5679       0.3827       0.5581       0.3106       0.3548       0.4871       0.3512       0.3012       0.5789 
N         194         194         194         194         167         194         194         194         194         194 
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Table XI. Subsample Tests, Equity Return Dependent Variable, With Facility-Specific and Borrower-Specific Controls. We use the Generalized Method 
of Moments to repeat the cointegration tests reported in Tables VI with loan facility-and borrower-specific control variables. The portfolios of equally weighted 
returns are formed using the following subsamples of observations: Loan observations with quotes below (low loan quotes) or above (high loan quotes) the 
median; loan observations with loan quote spreads below (low loan spreads) or above (high loan spreads) the median; loans with price below $70 (distressed 
loans) or above $90 (par loans); loans and without financial covenants; and observations with equity volume below (low equity volume) or above (high equity 
volume) the median. Variable definitions are as follows: RBt is the loan return. RSt is the equity return. RLt is the loan index return. RMt is the equity index return. 
RDt is the T-Bill return. Yt is the year of the observation. NBAt is sum of the number of bids and asks for the loan. SPRDt is the difference between average ask and 
average bid, divided by the average of these two values. Vt is the volume of trades on the equity market. PROB_KMV is the implied probability of default on the 
date of the observation. LNMV is the natural logarithm of the borrower’s market value on the date of the observation. LNDEBT is the natural logarithm of the 
borrower’s debt for the year of the observation. LEVERAGE is the borrower’s ratio of total debt to total assets for the year of the observation. INCOMTOA is 
the borrower’s ratio of operating income before depreciation to total assets for the year of the observation. EPS is the borrower’s earning per share for the year of 
the observation. PENNYSTOCK is an indicator variable that is equal to unity if the price of the borrower’s stock is less than $1 on the date of the observation. 
ARATE, BRATE, and CRATE are indicator variables that are equal to unity if the debt rating is between A3 and Aaa, B3 and Baa1, and C and Caa, respectively, 
and zero otherwise. LNDEALSIZE and LNFACILITYSIZE are the natural logarithm of the deal and facility size, respectively. LSPREAD is the basis point 
coupon spread over LIBOR plus the annual fee and upfront fee, spread over the life of the loan. UPFRONT_FEE is the upfront fee, ANNUAL_FEE is the annual 
fee, and COMMITMENT_FEE is the commitment fee charged on unused portions of the loan. MATURITY is the number of days until the loan facility matures, 
as specified at initiation. SECURED_YES is an indicator variable equal to unity if the facility is designated as securitized. LOAN_REVOLVER and 
LOAN_TERM are indicator variables that are equal to unity if the loan is a revolver or term loan, respectively. REFINANCING_YES is an indicator variable 
that is equal to unity if the loan facility is designated as being for refinancing. FINANCIAL_COVENANT is an indicator variable that is equal to unity if there 
are any of several financial covenants associated with the loan facility. NONFINANCIAL_COVENANT is an indicator variable that is equal to unity if there are 
any of several nonfinancial covenants associated with the loan facility. PPC is an indicator variable that is equal to unity if the loan facility has a performance 
pricing covenant. NUMBSYN is the number of lenders in the syndicate providing the loan. PURPOSE_CHANGE_OF_CONTROL is an indicator variable is an 
indicator variable that is equal to unity if the purpose of the loan is as an acquisition line, IPO related, associated with a Leveraged Buyout or Management 
Buyout, spinoff related, or takeover related. PURPOSE_ONGOING_BUSINESS is an indicator variable that is equal to unity if the purpose of the loan is for CP 
backup, capital expenditure, corporate purposes, debtor in possession, or working capital. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Variable 
Low number  
of loan 
quotes 
High number 
of loan  
quotes 
 
Low loan 
spreads 
 
High loan 
spreads 
Distressed 
loans 
(Price<=70) 
 
Par loans 
(Price>=90) 
Loans with 
financial 
covenants 
Loans without 
financial 
covenants 
 
Low equity 
volume 
 
High equity 
volume 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Intercept      29.7408       0.2198      16.4446       2.3385     340.8145       13.216       12.218      66.9423       9.3042         -5.7 
RBt       2.2896       4.0302***      -7.3384        2.127       1.4151*       1.4381       2.7011*       0.0995       1.5918*        4.168*** 
RBt-1      -1.3061      -1.0706       4.4776      -3.1904***       0.1231      -2.6325      -2.1311       0.5055      -2.1072**      -0.3374 
RSt-1      -0.1611**      -0.1556*      -0.0311      -0.0587       -0.455***      -0.0677      -0.0526      -0.2475**       0.0248      -0.0969 
RSt-2      -0.1401      -0.2189**      -0.0597      -0.1112      -0.2051      -0.0068      -0.1355      -0.1985**      -0.0552       -0.222** 
RMt       0.9436***       0.8941***       0.7753***       1.0564***        1.554***       0.8289***       0.9444***       0.8046***        0.684***       1.1602*** 
RMt-1       0.2866***        0.257**       0.1528*       0.1831       1.7006***       0.1954**        0.178       0.4718***       0.1044       0.2757** 
RMt-2       0.3159***       0.3122***       0.0873       0.3536**       0.4273       0.1064       0.2731**       0.4283***        0.018       0.4099*** 
RLt       1.6528**       0.5387       0.9513*       1.3859       8.6644**        0.722       0.9911       3.0885**       0.5426       0.9962 
RDt       16.511      -7.7891      20.6771      53.4549    -155.0991      -1.0186      26.8293      23.2015       5.6816      15.3966 
Yt      -0.0148      -0.0005      -0.0087       -0.001      -0.1747      -0.0062      -0.0059      -0.0328      -0.0043       0.0038 
NBAt       0.0439       0.0008       0.0074***      -0.0087       0.0545*       0.0024       0.0021       0.0083        0.005       0.0078** 
SPRDt      -1.0427       8.5965***      28.3777**      -1.1137      -0.7081       4.2082       0.3565       0.7812        0.785      -0.5324 
Vt       0.0000       0.0000       0.0000***       0.0000       0.0000       0.0000       0.0000       0.0000       0.0000       0.0000 
PROB_KMV       0.1100      -0.1683      -1.0196**       0.3975**        1.325**      -0.3802      -0.1229       0.4743       -0.158      -0.0061 
LNMV       0.0466       0.1024***       0.0654***        0.086**       0.4823***       0.1345***       0.0774**       0.1414***      -0.0002       0.0378* 
LNDEBT      -0.0783**        0.049      -0.0377      -0.0314      -0.0467       -0.088*      -0.0581      -0.0862**       0.0038      -0.0535* 
LEVERAGE      -0.1356      -0.1714       0.0933       0.1585       0.5951      -0.0005      -0.0149       0.3108*      -0.0254        0.249** 
INCOMETOA      -0.8565      -0.1666       0.2063        0.132       4.4498***      -0.7589      -1.8371*        0.706**       0.0024       0.4468 
EPS      -0.0003      -0.0052       0.0001       0.0036**      -0.0009      -0.0041      -0.0012      -0.0002       0.0006       0.0014 
PENNYSTOCK      -0.1454      -0.2375       0.0001      -0.0942      -0.0508        0.137      -0.1525      -0.3197***      -0.1962*       0.0933 
ARATE       1.1634      -1.7448*      -0.3253       0.9865       0.0001       0.5781       1.3259       0.0001       0.2582      -0.1009 
BRATE       0.3338***      -0.0126       0.0018       0.2879      -0.7167       0.3204*       0.0255       0.3679***       0.0354       0.2109*** 
CRATE       0.4145**      -0.1858       0.3105*      -0.1489        1.211**       0.8293***       0.5467       0.2243       0.0324       0.3661** 
LNDEALSIZE      -0.1081       0.0056      -0.1281**       -0.112       -0.106      -0.0975      -0.1426       -0.093      -0.0694      -0.0246 
LNFACILITYSIZE       0.1162      -0.1463       0.1313**       0.0201       0.1067      -0.0259      -0.0238      -0.0513       0.0432      -0.0691 
LSPREAD       0.0003       0.0001       0.0003       0.0001      -0.0006       0.0011      -0.0004       0.0005      -0.0006       0.0012*** 
UPFRONT_FEE      -0.0004       0.0000       0.0008      -0.0004      -0.0017       0.0025      -0.0031       0.0019**      -0.0012       0.0001 
ANNUAL_FEE      -0.0006       -0.002       0.0001       0.0013      -0.0003       -0.001       0.0015      -0.0102**      -0.0006      -0.0019 
COMMITMENT_FEE        0.008*      -0.0081      -0.0007       0.0043      -0.0026       0.0064       0.0142*       0.0044       0.0027       0.0000 
MATURITY       0.0000       0.0001       0.0000       0.0002      -0.0001       0.0002      -0.0001       0.0001*       0.0000       0.0001 
SECURED_YES       0.0465       0.1932      -0.0041      -0.3394       0.3198       -0.275       0.0592       0.3217       0.2176**      -0.2286* 
LOAN_REVOLVER      -0.1425       0.0791      -0.2832       0.0068      -0.6078      -0.5522      -0.0784      -0.5249**      -0.0286      -0.5646*** 
LOAN_TERM       0.1006       -0.066      -0.0714       0.0553      -0.9738*       -0.406       0.5448      -0.7602**      -0.0228      -0.8126*** 
REFINANCING_YES       -0.123       0.0807        0.164***       0.0245       0.4394      -0.1269       0.0286      -0.0913      -0.1043      -0.0653 
FINANCIAL_COVENANT       -0.181      -0.1162        0.013       -0.258       0.5009       0.1342       0.0001       0.0001      -0.0026       0.2659** 
NONFINANCIAL_COVENANT       0.1896       0.2326       0.0498       0.1486      -0.3286       0.1921       2.2903      -0.1561       -0.062       0.0968 
PPC       0.3073***       0.0873      -0.0594       0.0476      -0.2685       0.1941       0.3173*        0.454**       0.1313***       0.0614 
NUMBSYN       0.0058      -0.0028      -0.0011      -0.0046      -0.0094       0.0052       0.0104       0.0094*      -0.0028       0.0074*** 
PURPOSE_CHANGE_OF_CONTROL       0.0038      -0.0244      -0.0119       0.1687       0.3254       0.1264       0.0718      -0.3418*       0.0463      -0.1876** 
PURPOSE_ONGOING_BUSINESS       -0.147       0.3422*      -0.0044       0.3748*      -0.9367**       0.3151*       0.1273       0.0687       0.0679      -0.2225** 
Adjusted-R2       0.6176       0.6056       0.6964       0.4898       0.2758       0.7113       0.6188       0.4529       0.5577       0.6337 
N         194         194         194         194         167         194         194         194         194         194 
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Table XII. Granger Causality Tests With Facility-Specific and Borrower-Specific Controls. We repeat the Granger tests reported in Tables VII with loan 
facility-and borrower-specific control variables. Each model is estimated twice: restricted, through excluding the variables RSt-1 and RBt-1 from equations (3) and 
(4), respectively, and unrestricted where these variables are not excluded. We then compare the sum of squared residuals for the unrestricted and restricted 
models, and conduct F-tests and asymptotically equivalent tests of the null hypothesis that β2 = 0. Significance denotes a finding of Granger causality. Test 
results are reported for portfolios formed using the following subsamples of observations: Loan observations with quotes below (low loan quotes) or above (high 
loan quotes) the median; loan observations with loan quote spreads below (low loan spreads) or above (high loan spreads) the median; loans with price below 
$70 (distressed loans) or above $90 (par loans); loans and without financial covenants; and observations with equity volume below (low equity volume) or above 
(high equity volume) the median. Controls include RMt RMt-1 RMt-2 RLt RDt Yt NBAt SPRDt Vt prob_kmv lnMV LNDEBT LEVERAGE INCOMETOA EPS 
pennystock ARATE BRATE CRATE LNDEALSIZE LNFACILITYSIZE LSPREAD UPFRONT_FEE ANNUAL_FEE COMMITMENT_FEE MATURITY 
SECURED_YES LOAN_REVOLVER LOAN_TERM REFINANCING_YES FINANCIAL_COVENANT NONFINANCIAL_COVENANT PPC NUMBSYN 
PURPOSE_CHANGE_OF_CONTROL PURPOSE_ONGOING_BUSINESS. Variable definitions are as follows: RBt is the loan return. RSt is the equity return. 
RMt is the equity index return. RDt is the T-Bill return. Yt is the year of the observation. NBAt is sum of the number of bids and asks for the loan. SPRDt is the 
difference between average ask and average bid, divided by the average of these two values. Vt is the volume of trades on the equity market. PROB_KMV is the 
implied probability of default on the date of the observation. LNMV is the natural logarithm of the borrower’s market value on the date of the observation. 
LNDEBT is the natural logarithm of the borrower’s debt for the year of the observation. LEVERAGE is the borrower’s ratio of total debt to total assets for the 
year of the observation. INCOMTOA is the borrower’s ratio of operating income before depreciation to total assets for the year of the observation. EPS is the 
borrower’s earning per share for the year of the observation. PENNYSTOCK is an indicator variable that is equal to unity if the price of the borrower’s stock is 
less than $1 on the date of the observation. ARATE, BRATE, and CRATE are indicator variables that are equal to unity if the debt rating is between A3 and Aaa, 
B3 and Baa1, and C and Caa, respectively, and zero otherwise. LNDEALSIZE and LNFACILITYSIZE are the natural logarithm of the deal and facility size, 
respectively. LSPREAD is the basis point coupon spread over LIBOR plus the annual fee and upfront fee, spread over the life of the loan. UPFRONT_FEE is the 
upfront fee, ANNUAL_FEE is the annual fee, and COMMITMENT_FEE is the commitment fee charged on unused portions of the loan. MATURITY is the 
number of days until the loan facility matures, as specified at initiation. SECURED_YES is an indicator variable equal to unity if the facility is designated as 
securitized. LOAN_REVOLVER and LOAN_TERM are indicator variables that are equal to unity if the loan is a revolver or term loan, respectively. 
REFINANCING_YES is an indicator variable that is equal to unity if the loan facility is designated as being for refinancing. FINANCIAL_COVENANT is an 
indicator variable that is equal to unity if there are any of several financial covenants associated with the loan facility. NONFINANCIAL_COVENANT is an 
indicator variable that is equal to unity if there are any of several nonfinancial covenants associated with the loan facility. PPC is an indicator variable that is 
equal to unity if the loan facility has a performance pricing covenant. NUMBSYN is the number of lenders in the syndicate providing the loan. 
PURPOSE_CHANGE_OF_CONTROL is an indicator variable is an indicator variable that is equal to unity if the purpose of the loan is as an acquisition line, 
IPO related, associated with a Leveraged Buyout or Management Buyout, spinoff related, or takeover related. PURPOSE_ONGOING_BUSINESS is an 
indicator variable that is equal to unity if the purpose of the loan is for CP backup, capital expenditure, corporate purposes, debtor in possession, or working 
capital. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Panel A. Loan Return Dependent Variable. . Significance denotes that lagged weekly equity returns Granger cause weekly loans returns. 
 
 
 
Variable 
Low number 
of loan 
quotes 
High number
of loan  
quotes 
 
Low loan 
spreads 
 
High loan 
spreads 
Distressed 
loans 
(Price<=70)
 
Par loans 
(Price>=90)
Loans with
financial 
covenants 
Loans without 
financial 
covenants 
 
Low equity
volume 
 
High equity
volume 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Number of Observations 194 194 194 194 167 194 194 194 194 194 
SSE restricted 0.0005 0.0007 0.0000 0.0015 0.2228 0.0001 0.0005 0.0026 0.0006 0.0007 
SSE unrestricted 0.0005 0.0007 0.0000 0.0014 0.2098 0.0001 0.0005 0.0025 0.0006 0.0007 
F-test 6.3948** 11.9019*** 0.8441 9.7168*** 10.1922*** 0.5822 7.2902*** 2.888* 1.0864 3.7903* 
Asymptotically equivalent test 6.4953** 12.0889*** 0.8573 9.8694*** 10.3787*** 0.5914 7.4047*** 2.9334* 1.1035 3.8498** 
 
 
 
Panel B. Equity Return Dependent Variable. Significance denotes that lagged weekly loan returns Granger cause weekly equity returns. 
 
 
 
Variable 
Low number 
of loan 
quotes 
High number
of loan  
quotes 
 
Low loan 
spreads 
 
High loan 
spreads 
Distressed 
loans 
(Price<=70)
 
Par loans 
(Price>=90)
Loans with
financial 
covenants 
Loans without 
financial 
covenants 
 
Low equity
volume 
 
High equity
volume 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Number of Observations 194 194 194 194 167 194 194 194 194 194 
SSE restricted 0.3002 0.3219 0.1666 0.5302 7.3297 0.2155 0.2947 0.4109 0.1954 0.4543 
SSE unrestricted 0.2972 0.3193 0.1649 0.5258 7.3211 0.2155 0.2921 0.4100 0.1907 0.4540 
F-test 1.9703 1.5951 1.8866 1.587 0.1916 0.0035 1.6572 0.4091 4.7422** 0.1622 
Asymptotically equivalent test 2.0012 1.6202 1.9163 1.612 0.1951 0.0036 1.6832 0.4155 4.8167** 0.1648 
 
 
 
